Hans Morgenthau, the Pioneer of Classical Realism
The way a nation interacts on the world stage is the subject of the area of policy analysis we term “Geopolitics”. The way the state interacts with others around the globe has begged the question, how should a state act in its relation to others. Among the countless theories of foreign policy, the two that stand above them all have been a Realist vs Idealist foreign policy. The ideas, born out of the political chaos of the 20th century have each defined American foreign policy in their own ways.
Is it the United States’ business to be The United States in the world? Is it our business to spread democracy, capitalism, liberalism, and security to the rest of the world? The idealists would wholeheartedly agree, taking inspiration in the doctrines of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan, both Bush’s and the Clinton administration. American idealism has been our modus operandi since the cold war; but what happened to the sister of Idealism, Realism. If you paid close attention to the aforementioned idealist administration, you might recognize one notable absence from the list. Richard Nixon.
The Classical Realist would argue that it is inconsequential what the “United States” is in spirit, beliefs, and national character. All that matters in geopolitics is who holds how much power, and for how long. The realist would hold that nations, (similar to people), will always act out of securing or expanding their current power. This power is secured through the maintenance (or expansion) of Spheres of Influence. Both sides, Idealists and Realists operate in the interest of maximizing global peace and prosperity- while idealists put their faith in noble ideals of western values, the realists trust that hegemons (like the US and Soviet Union) will not act aggressively, and to a detriment to world peace, unless their spheres of influence were threatened.
In this sense, the classical realist must view the countries of the world as akin to poker chips, the players are the hegemons of the day, the cards are our nuclear arsenals, and the table is the world stage. The realist’s only interest is to satisfy each of the players’ sense of security of their chips. Going back to the Nixon administration and the chief proponent of its foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, the focus was not so much the consolidation of American authority, but the careful maintenance of the Soviet sphere of influence, whilst securing the American. This is why Kissinger very recently advocated for Ukraine to be surrendered to the Russians, as to maintain the balance of power, and the Russian sphere of influence, in the interest of not provoking a World War.
Henry Kissinger (Left), and President Richard Nixon (Right)
So how does the Nixonian-Kissinger legacy reverberate today? We can look to China on the other end of the 21st century geopolitical poker table, alongside the US. Is it in the best interest of world peace for the US to stay out of places like Taiwan? Kashmir? Tibet? Unlike the USSR the Chinese American rivalry is as much (if not more) economic than land or military based. Should we adopt a stance of letting the Chinese do business in the developing world, so long as they “keep to their own side” while we have ours?
Whether or not the budding foreign policy of the United States chooses our famous American Idealism or not, the decision for the future of this country, and the world, must be one made out of a careful discourse of how power in the world takes form and action. Only then can we be confident in our place as the leaders of the free world.
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